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The growing frequency of cybersecurity incidents 
commonly requires organizations to notify customers of 
ongoing events. However, the content contained within 
these notifications varies widely, including differences 
in the level of detail, apportioning of blame, 
compensation, and corrective action. This study seeks to 
identify patterns contained within cybersecurity 
incident notifications by constructing a typology of 
organizational responses. Based on a detailed review of 
465 global cybersecurity incidents that occurred during 
the first half of 2020, we obtained and qualitatively 
analyzed 187 customer notifications. Our results reveal 
three distinct organizational response types associated 
with the level of detail contained within the notification 
(full transparency, guarded, opacity), as well as three 
additional response types associated with the 
benefitting party (customer interest, balanced interest, 
company interest). This work extends past 
classifications of cybersecurity incident notifications 
and provides a template of possible notification 
approaches that could be adopted by organizations. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Cybersecurity incidents are increasingly common 
within organizations [1, 2] and often require 
communications with customers regarding details of the 
event [3, 4]. These notifications can come in various 
forms, including formal press releases, postings on 
company websites, emails, social media, and blogs. 
Stakeholders, including  shareholders, governments, 
regulators, and the media, pay close attention to 
organizational responses to cybersecurity incidents in 
determining what actions they may wish to take [5, 6].  
Although past research has established the link 
between cybersecurity incidents and downstream 
consequences on stock prices [7-9], management 
turnover [10], and audit fees [11], there has been a 
limited focus on the actual content contained within 
publicly available cybersecurity incident notifications. 
Depending on the country where the organization is 
based, as well as the nature of the incident itself, these 
notices can include acknowledgements of what 
occurred, what systems/data were impacted, and what 
the organization is doing (or has done) to respond. 
Although basic notification templates are available from 
a variety of sources [e.g., 12, 13, 14], no widely 
accepted format has yet been established and the nature 
of communications can vary widely [3, 15]. Recent 
work on the topic has begun to investigate the 
relationships between the individual choices made by 
organizations (e.g., offering compensation or 
apologizing) and how these choices can impact 
customers [e.g., 16, 17] and investors [e.g., 18]. 
However, the details contained within 
cybersecurity incident notifications are particularly 
important to customers and provide valuable signals 
regarding the organization’s priorities and managerial 
philosophy. Past research suggests that stakeholders 
(including customers, employees, the media, and the 
legal system) make judgements on an organization’s 
properties and behaviors, which combine to form 
macro-level conclusions about the legitimacy of the 
institution; these perceptions can directly influence 
performance and access to resources [5]. In a 
cybersecurity incident context, we argue that the content 
included in a notification to customers can serve to 
shape how those customers judge if an organization’s 
response is fair and reasonable. Such judgements could 
then contribute to downstream actions, such as 
diminished market share, regulatory penalties, and 
lawsuits. 
In order to investigate this further, we pose the 
following research question: What patterns are present 
in the approaches used by organizations when notifying 
customers about cybersecurity incidents? To address 
this question, we examined the organizational responses 
to 465 global cybersecurity incidents reported between 
January and June 2020. From these, we collected 187 
incident notifications and qualitatively analyzed their 
content. We identified three distinct organizational 
response types associated with the “level of detail” 
contained within the notification, as well as three 
additional response types associated with the 
“benefitting party”.  
Our results contribute to the cybersecurity literature 
by articulating the distinct approaches that organizations 
use when responding to cybersecurity incidents. 





Although past research has classified the individual 
characteristics of organizational responses, we are not 
aware of past research that has grouped these 
characteristics together to form higher level response 
categories. The development of these categories is an 
important step in analyzing the resulting downstream 
stakeholder consequences and can be leveraged by 
managers when determining the optimal strategy for 
communicating cybersecurity incident details to 
customers. We also provide a distinctly global view on 
cybersecurity incident notifications, which stands in 
contrast to much past research that commonly focuses 
on U.S.-based incidents. 
The remaining sections of our paper are presented 
as follows. First, we describe the conceptual 
background, in terms of the crisis response strategies 
used by organizations. Next, we outline our 
methodological approach, including data collection and 
analysis. We then present our results, discuss the 
implications for research and practice, and conclude 
with opportunities for future research.  
2. Conceptual background 
Broadly, cybersecurity refers to “the prevention of 
damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and—if 
needed—the restoration of electronic information and 
communications systems, and the information they 
contain, in order to strengthen the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of these systems” [19, p. 41]. 
Within organizations, an important element of a 
successful cybersecurity management program is 
effectively responding to incidents, which represent 
unexpected events that could compromise business 
operations [20].  
In framing our study, we draw on concepts from the 
marketing, organizational behavior, and information 
systems literature related to how institutions respond to 
emergency situations. In doing so, we consider the 
different approaches and strategies that can be adopted. 
Of particular interest in this study are the approaches 
used to communicate with customers following 
cybersecurity incidents. Although organizations may 
need to communicate (e.g., risk disclosures) with other 
stakeholders such as regulators or investors based on 
formalized guidelines [21-23], our interest in customer 
notifications is motivated by the flexibility that many 
organizations have in how much or how little to disclose 
following an incident. In cases where private customer 
information is compromised, organizations may be 
required to meet at least a minimum standard of 
notification procedures, but these guidelines vary 
depending on the location of the incident [24]. However, 
firms may choose to offer more details than necessary. 
On the one hand, many organizations are sensitive to the 
inconvenience that cybersecurity incidents can have on 
customers and are keen to express regret for the role they 
may have played in the event; on the other hand, 
organizations are wary of the legal and financial 
difficulties that may result from formally accepting 
responsibility for an incident. We provide an overview 
of these crisis response strategies in the following 
section, which forms an important basis for our analysis. 
2.1. Crisis response strategies 
Past research suggests that customers are acutely 
aware of the events and behaviors displayed by the 
organizations they interact with, which can lead to either 
satisfying or unsatisfying experiences [25]. In the 
specific context of a crisis situation, which refers to “an 
untimely but predictable event that has actual or 
potential consequences for stakeholders” [26, p. 64], 
how an organization responds can have long-term 
impacts on its reputation and profitability [27].  
A key element of an organization’s response to a 
crisis pertains to its communications with stakeholders. 
Indeed, “managing a crisis effectively is crucial in 
reestablishing control of the organization, restoring the 
company image, and regaining stakeholder trust” [28, p. 
164]. For example, organizational apologies following a 
crisis have been found to correspond with inconsistent 
results. Some research suggests that leaders who 
apologize for mistakes are perceived positively by 
victims [29], while other others perceive apologies as 
reinforcing views of unfairness, particularly in cases 
where the communication is viewed as insincere [30]. 
The effectiveness of an organization’s response to 
a crisis can be evaluated in a variety of ways. Past 
research has pointed to the reactions of customers on 
social media [31], the consistency of communications 
over time [32], and proactive preparations that can 
overcome crisis barriers [33] as factors associated with 
effective responses. 
2.2. Responses to cybersecurity incidents  
In the context of cybersecurity incidents, which we 
view as a type of organizational crisis (per the definition 
provided above), a good deal of research attention has 
been dedicated to the financial consequences of 
cybersecurity incident announcements. For example, 
Cavusoglu et al. [7] evaluate the link between data 
breach announcements and the market value of the 
announcing firm. Similarly, Malhotra and Malhotra [34] 
examine the links between reports of data breaches and 
a decline in the market value of a firm. 
More recently, research has extended beyond 
treatments of incident announcements as a binary, 
“black box” and increasingly consider the nature and 
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characteristics of the announcement itself. For example, 
Masuch et al. [18] evaluate the consequences of firm 
response strategies after a data breach. The results 
suggest that apologizing after a data breach has 
detrimental effects on investor behavior, while 
whitewashing (i.e., downplaying the incident) has a 
small positive effect on stock value. Similarly, 
Diesterhöft et al. [15] analyze the response strategies of 
313 data breaches and derive a taxonomy from the 
results, including compensation, apology, 
whitewashing, action, value commitment, customer 
relationship, type of information disclosure, and 
customer behavior advice. Other work by Greve et al. 
[17] evaluates the link between a company’s recovery 
actions (i.e., compensation or remorse) and a customer’s 
satisfaction. The study finds that a mix of both 
compensation and remorse is best to increase customer 
satisfaction, but that severe data breaches limit the 
positive benefits that remorse can have on satisfaction. 
Finally, Goode et al. [35] consider how much 
compensation to offer customers following a 
cybersecurity incident. Results from the study indicate 
that compensating customers can have a positive impact 
on perceived service quality and intentions to continue 
as a customer. 
Cultural differences can also play a role in the 
consequences of a cybersecurity incident. For example, 
Greve et al. [16] compare customer satisfaction levels in 
Germany and Bolivia following data breaches. The 
study examines the impact of compensation or an 
apology, as well as the broader implications on loyalty, 
trust, and word of mouth. The authors find that that 
cultural differences do exist, such as Germans being 
more likely to demand compensation, while Bolivians 
tend to be satisfied with an apology. Similarly, Kim and 
Lee [36] compare organizational statements pertaining 
to cybersecurity incidents from firms located in the 
United States and South Korea. They find differences in 
terms of responsibility admittance and expressions of 
sympathy (more South Korean firms contained these 
elements), as well as with reassurance and 
compensation (more U.S. firms contained these 
elements). 
2.3. Research approach  
Based on the background described above, our 
objective in this study was to build on past research that 
identifies the typical characteristics of cybersecurity 
incident notifications to better understand how those 
characteristics are aggregated together. Although 
managers are undoubtedly aware of the potential 
benefits and drawbacks of specific customer response 
tactics (e.g., apologizing or offering compensation), it 
remains unclear how organizations assemble collections 
of tactics together to form a notification strategy. 
Although we might expect managers to select several 
notification characteristics that align with the context, 
risk, and objectives of the firm, the existing research has 
not yet uncovered the extent to which patterns may exist 
in the characteristics of cybersecurity notifications. 
We suggest that this line of inquiry can provide 
important insights into the broader strategies and 
techniques used by organizations in response to 
cybersecurity incidents. From a practice perspective, 
identifying such patterns can provide clarity on the 
alternative approaches that could be adopted as a 
response to cybersecurity incidents. From a research 
perspective, identifying relationships between 
notification characteristics is a key step in constructing 
broader theoretical connections between incident 
response approaches and subsequent downstream 
impacts, such as diminished market share, regulatory 
penalties, and lawsuits. Although we confine our focus 
in this study to the patterns within incident notifications, 
we view this as an important step towards uncovering 
downstream relationships with these important 
outcomes of interest. We outline the details of our 
methodological approach in the following section. 
3. Methodology  
We adopted a qualitative, content analysis approach 
based on publicly available information associated with 
cybersecurity incidents. This approach was deemed 
appropriate since we were interested in the 
characteristics and content contained within the 
cybersecurity notifications made by organizations. 
Although the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse database 
has been commonly used in past research related to 
cybersecurity incidents [e.g., 37, 38, 39], at the time the 
study was conducted, no data had been published related 
to 2020 incidents. As a result, we chose to draw on a 
listing of worldwide cybersecurity incidents published 
by IT Governance Ltd. [40]. Each month, the website 
publishes a listing of links to publicly announced 
cybersecurity incidents, including ransomware attacks 
and data breaches, from around the world.  
We focused on the incidents reported by the website 
during January through June 2020. This period was 
chosen because it provided a lengthy list of incidents 
and allowed for several months to elapse following each 
incident (our data collection was conducted in the first 
quarter of 2021), which would provide sufficient time 
for organizations to craft and release incident 
notifications to customers. We identified a total of 465 
incidents (61 in January, 105 in February, 62 in March, 
48 in April, 103 in May, and 86 in June). For each 
incident, we recorded the company name, date that the 
incident was reported, industry, type of incident, a 
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summary of the incident, and details of the 
organizational response. Where this information was 
incomplete based on the initial link provided by the IT 
Governance website, we conducted supplementary 
searches in three databases—ABI/INFORM, Factiva, 
and Nexis Uni—using keywords such as "breach", 
"incident", and "cyberattack" alongside the company 
name. We also searched each organization’s website for 
cybersecurity incident notifications. A total of 187 
incident notifications were identified. 
We arrived at several explanations as to why some 
of the identified incidents did not have notifications. 
First, depending on the date of the incident, some 
notifications may have been released on a corporate 
website and then subsequently taken offline before our 
research was conducted. In other cases, notifications 
may not have been created because the incidents did not 
directly affect customer data or occurred in countries 
where notifications were not required. Finally, 
depending on the nature of the organization (e.g., 
defense administrations, educational institutions), 
incident notifications were sometimes sent via 
traditional mail or email and were not posted online. 
3.1. Data analysis  
Our data analysis focused on the 187 collected 
cybersecurity incident notifications. We qualitatively 
analyzed the content of the notifications based on a 
series of nine characteristics drawn from the crisis 
response and cybersecurity literature (refer to Table 1). 
Although we do not claim that the listed characteristics 
are exhaustive, we intended to draw on a thorough 
collection of the characteristics identified in past 
research (see references in Table 1 for coding sources). 
For each of the notifications, we recorded whether 
the corresponding characteristics were present or absent. 
During the coding process, the author team met 
regularly to discuss the coding approach. Where there 
were any ambiguities in determining a particular 
incident’s characteristics, the author team discussed the 
situation and agreed on a coding outcome. 
 






Recognition that a cybersecurity event 
has occurred, as well as the articulation 
of specific details (e.g., what happened, 
when it occurred). 
Whitewashing Diverting blame away from the victim 
organization and blaming others (e.g., 
employees, suppliers); also includes 
downplaying of the severity of the 
incident [15, 18]. 
Apology An expression of remorse or regret 
about the incident [18, 41]. 
Compensation The offering of monetary (e.g., refunds 
or discounts) or service (e.g., credit 
monitoring) compensation to 
customers impacted by the incident 
[15, 35, 41]. 
Responsive 
action 
A description of the proactive and/or 
preventive actions that have been (or 
will be) undertaken by the organization 
in the wake of the incident [15]. 
Value 
commitment 
Explanation of the company’s 
commitment to ensuring security  
and/or transparency [15]. 
Focused on the 
customers 
Explicit recognition of the importance 




A detailed disclosure of the data has 
been impacted (e.g., passwords, 
financial information) [15]. 
Customer 
advice 
Recommendations are provided on 
how customers should move forward 
after the incident (e.g., changing a 
password, monitoring credit) [15]. 
 
Following the qualitative coding, we used an 
inductive approach to search for patterns in the grouping 
of characteristics across the entire pool of cybersecurity 
incident notifications. We sought to identify both 
“extreme” types of incident notifications (i.e., 
uncommon, radical strategies), as well as “typical” 
responses (i.e., commonly adopted strategies). By 
iteratively reviewing our incident coding results, we 
began to identify similarities in how some organizations 
responded. Based on these initial similarities, we 
constructed a preliminary matrix of notification 
characteristic groupings. As we continued examining 
more of the coding results, these groupings were 
refined. Early in the process, we identified five distinct 
groups, but this was later extended to eight, and then 
finally reduced down to six. Collectively, we refer to 
these as notification types. Refer to Table 2 for details, 
where each type represents a collection of 
characteristics that were coded as being either present 
(e.g., the organization apologized in the notification; 
indicated with a “Y” in Table 3) or absent (e.g., the 
organization did not apologize; indicated with an “N” in 
Table 3). Those characteristics that are not explicitly 
considered as part of a notification type are indicated 
with a “-”. Three of these types (full transparency, 
guarded, and opacity) are grouped together as they are 
all concerned with the level of detail contained within 
the notice, while the other three types (customer interest, 
balanced interest, and company interest) are grouped 
together due to their orientation around the party that 
benefits from the notification strategy.  
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A notification is fully forthcoming and 
contains comprehensive details pertaining 
to the incident without whitewashing. A 
clear organizational response is specified, 
as well as a value commitment. 
Guarded A notification discloses minimal 
information relevant to the incident, while 
also whitewashing the company’s 
responsibility for the event. However, a 
clear organizational response is specified, 
as is a value commitment. 
Opacity A notification discloses minimal 
information relevant to the incident, while 
also whitewashing the company’s 
responsibility for the event. Although 
there is responsive action noted, there is 
no value commitment. 
Customer 
interest 
A notification contains information that 
primarily benefits customers. The 
company takes full accountability for the 
incident, while also giving customers 
advice and compensation. 
Balanced 
interest 
A notification contains information that 
benefits both the customer and the 
company. Though customers are not 
compensated, the company takes full 
accountability for the incident. 
Company 
interest 
A notification contains information that 
primarily benefits the company. The 
company takes no accountability for the 
incident, gives no advice to customers, 
and offers no compensation. 
 
















































































Full Transparency Y N - - Y Y - Y - 
Guarded N Y - - Y Y - N - 
Opacity N Y - - Y N - N - 
Customer interest - - Y Y - - Y - Y 
Balanced interest - - Y N - - - - - 
Company interest - - N N - - N - N 
 
In the following section we provide details on how 
these six notification types were represented across our 
187 cybersecurity incidents. 
4. Results  
The cybersecurity incidents that formed a basis for 
our study spanned the first six months of 2020, with 
February (39) and May (40) containing the highest 
quantity of notifications. Refer to Table 4 for details. In 
terms of the originating country of the notification, the 
United States was most common (133), followed by 
Canada (15) and the United Kingdom (12). As well, 
notifications were most commonly identified from 
organizations in the healthcare sector (55), followed by 
education (25), and retail (24).   
 
Table 4. Organization and Incident Details 
Category Description 
Month January: 29 (15.5%) 
February: 39 (20.9%) 
March: 22 (11.8%) 
April: 24 (12.8%) 
May: 40 (21.4%) 
June: 33 (17.6%) 
Country United States: 133 (71.1%) 
Canada: 15 (8.0%) 
United Kingdom: 12 (6.4%) 
Australia: 6 (3.2%) 
Japan: 5 (2.7%) 
Other: 16 (8.6%) 
Industry Healthcare and Medical: 55 (29.4%) 
Educational Institutions: 25 (13.4%) 
Retail: 24 (12.8%) 
Government and Military: 22 (11.8%) 
Technology: 18 (9.6%)  
Other: 15 (8.0%) 
Finance and Insurance: 14 (7.5%) 
Hospitality: 9 (4.8%) 
Non-profit: 5 (2.7%) 
 
In terms of the basic presence or absence of the nine 
notification characteristics, 72% contained a detailed 
explanation, 35% included whitewashing elements, 
52% contained an apology, 35% included 
compensation, 94% had responsive action, 83% had a 
value commitment, 93% articulated a focus on 
customers, 78% were disclosed openly, and 68% 
contained advice. Refer to Table 5 for details.  
 
Table 5. Notification Characteristic Coding 
Characteristic Yes No 
Detailed explanation  135 (72%) 52 (28%) 
Whitewashing  65 (35%) 121 (65%) 
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Apology  98 (52%) 89 (48%) 
Compensation  66 (35%) 121 (65%) 
Responsive action  175 (94%) 12 (6%) 
Value commitment  155 (83%) 31 (17%) 
Focused on customers  174 (93%) 13 (7%) 
Open information disclosure 146 (78%) 41 (22%) 
Customer advice  128 (68%) 59 (32%) 
4.1. Incident notification types  
As noted above, we identified six notification types 
from our analysis, within two groups. The first group, 
which contained the full transparency type, the guarded 
type, and the opacity type, was focused on the level of 
detail contained within the notice. For instance, an 
example of the full transparency type came with Pacific 
Specialty Insurance Company’s notification, which 
included extensive details on the incident, as well as a 
clear commitment to customers: 
“The types of information contained within the 
potentially impacted emails varied by individual but 
include: an individual’s name, Social Security 
number, driver’s license and/or government issued 
identification, financial information, payment card 
information, medical information, and health 
insurance information. Pacific Specialty is 
committed to, and takes very seriously, its 
responsibility to protect all data in its possession. 
Pacific Specialty is continuously taking steps to 
enhance data security protections. As part of its 
incident response, it changed the log-in credentials 
for all employee email accounts to prevent further 
unauthorized access…Pacific Specialty established 
a dedicated assistance line for individuals seeking 
additional information regarding this incident.”  
- Pacific Specialty Insurance Company [42] 
 
In comparison, an example of a guarded 
notification type was found with the City of Dawson 
Creek. In this case, although an organizational response 
is specified, there are relatively few details provided on 
the incident and the organization downplays the severity 
of the event (i.e., whitewashing): 
“In the early hours of Thursday, January 9th, the 
City of Dawson Creek discovered that it was the 
victim of a cyber-attack in which the City’s network 
was illegally accessed and infected with 
ransomware. The malware was able to encrypt a 
number of City systems, rendering them temporarily 
unusable. City of Dawson Creek staff worked 
quickly to isolate the attack and to activate a 
comprehensive cyber incident investigation and 
response. The impacted systems were backed up, 
and all necessary steps are being taken to restore 
access to systems and files, and to ensure operations 
and services return to normal as quickly as possible. 
There is currently no evidence to suggest that any 
information was removed from the City’s systems or 
inappropriately accessed, and cyber security experts 
are working quickly to confirm this.” - City of 
Dawson Creek [43] 
 
Finally, with the opacity type, we found that 
organizations were much more restrictive with the 
information they were willing to share. For example, at 
Enloe Medical Center, the organization provides few 
details on the incident and downplays the event’s 
severity. There is also no clear commitment to customer 
security: 
“Two weeks following a ransomware incident 
affecting network infrastructure, Enloe Medical 
Center is nearing full-functional restoration of its 
core systems. Upon discovery of the Jan. 2 incident, 
Enloe’s comprehensive emergency protocols were 
immediately implemented to safeguard patient 
records…The swift, seasoned response of Enloe’s 
Information Technology personnel resulted in major 
clinical programs being restored and back online 
within three days of the incident. Ancillary clinical 
programs were restored and back online shortly 
thereafter. At this time, there is no indication or 
evidence that suggests patient data was accessed, or 
exfiltrated.” - Enloe Medical Center [44] 
 
The second group of notification types, which 
contained the customer-interest type, the balanced-
interest type, and the company-interest type, are 
oriented towards the party that benefits from the 
notification strategy. For example, the customer-interest 
type aims to cater to the concerns and well-being of 
customers. An example is at Tandem Diabetes Care, 
where the organization takes accountability for the 
incident, provides advice on how customers should 
proceed, and offers compensation in the form of credit 
monitoring and identity management: 
“We recommend that customers review the billing 
statements they receive from their healthcare 
providers. If they see services they did not receive, 
they should contact the provider immediately. For 
those customers whose Social Security numbers 
were included in the email accounts, we are offering 
a complimentary membership of credit monitoring 
and identity protection services. We take the privacy 
and confidentiality of our customers’ information 
very seriously and apologize for any inconvenience 
or concern this incident may cause our customers.”          
- Tandem Diabetes Care [45] 
 
In contrast, the balanced interest type attempts to 
serve the interests of both customers and the company. 
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For example, the University of Utah Health notification 
includes the acknowledgement of responsibility, though 
no customer compensation is offered: 
“We recommend patients review the statements they 
receive from their health care providers. If there are 
discrepancies or services that you did not receive, 
please contact the provider immediately. We deeply 
regret any concern or inconvenience this may cause 
our patients. We are actively reviewing information 
protocols, reinforcing information security 
procedures with our employees and implementing 
changes where needed to help prevent an incident 
like this from happening again.” - University of 
Utah Health [46] 
 
Finally, the company-interest type frames its 
notifications in a protective, defensive way, which seeks 
to best serve the organization. For example, the 
following notification from Transavia does not take any 
accountability for the event, provides no advice for 
customers, and offers no compensation: 
“We continuously monitor our IT landscape to track 
deviating activities. We have recently found that 
there has been a case of unwanted access to a 
Transavia mailbox. After investigation, it appeared 
that this mailbox contained a file with personal data 
of a number of passengers who traveled with us…We 
have reported this to the Dutch Data Protection 
Authority. Despite the fact that this concerns data 
from the beginning of 2015 and that it did not 
contain sensitive data such as address data, credit 
card information or passport information, we [will] 
personally inform the passengers involved about this 
event.”  - Transavia [47] 
4.2. Patterns across incident notification types 
Of the incident responses that fully aligned with our 
six identified notification types, 70 were full 
transparency, 7 were guarded, 1 was opacity, 35 were 
customer interest, 10 were company interest, and 59 
were balanced interest (some notifications belonged to 
one “level of detail” type, as well as one “benefitting 
party” type). We also noted that 55 incident notices did 
not fully align with any of the incident notification 
types. 
Since the full transparency and customer-interest 
types share similar objectives in terms of information 
distribution, we expected incidents belonging to one 
category to also correspond to the other. We found that 
this was the case with 15 notifications. Similarly, we 
expected responses that were guarded to overlap with 
balanced interest and four notices were found to do so. 
Finally, we expected notifications that were the opacity 
type to also be company-interest type, but none were. 
Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, we also 
found that three incidents were coded to both full 
transparency and company interest, while 27 incidents 
were coded to full transparency and balanced interest. 
We also noted that one incident was coded to both 
guarded and customer interest. 
5. Discussion 
The objective of this study was to identify patterns 
in the approaches used by organizations when notifying 
customers about cybersecurity incidents. We 
qualitatively coded the characteristics of 187 
notifications associated with cybersecurity incidents 
that occurred during the first half of 2020. Our results 
highlighted six distinct notification types. The first three 
types were grouped together as pertaining to the level of 
detail in the notice: full transparency, guarded, and 
opacity. The second three types were grouped together 
based on the party that benefits from the notification 
strategy: customer interest, balanced interest, and 
company interest. 
The characteristics of the notifications in our 
sample were distinct from those in previous studies. In 
particular, the notifications were drawn from a total of 
18 countries, whereas past research [e.g., 18] tends to 
focus on firms based in the United States or on a two-
country comparison [e.g., 16, 36]. This provides a 
uniquely global perspective on cybersecurity incidents 
and the associated notification strategies. For example, 
Kim and Lee [36] examined 108 notifications in the 
United States and South Korea. They found the most 
incidents in the retail sector (25.9%), followed by 
technology (13.9%) and healthcare (12%). In 
comparison, our sample had the most incidents 
originating from healthcare (29.4%), followed by 
education (13.4%) and retail (12.8%). The variation 
here might be explained by the different countries that 
were examined, but it could also be attributed to the 
period in which the Kim and Lee data was collected 
(2008–2016). For example, the recent rise in 
ransomware attacks has made healthcare and 
educational  institutions particularly popular targets 
[48]. However, despite those differences, our results 
showed similar rates of compensation (35.3%) and 
whitewashing (34.8%) relative to Kim and Lee’s 
findings (33.3% and 30.5%, respectively). 
Compared to other research, such as Diesterhöft et 
al. [15], our findings also show that a number of the 
U.S.-based notification characteristics exist similarly in 
a global dataset. For example, we found that 93.6% of 
notifications contained responsive actions, 78.1% 
utilized open disclosure, and 82.9% articulated a value 
commitment. This compares to 84.3%, 82.1%, and 
80.5%, respectively, in Diesterhöft et al. [15]. However, 
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our results suggested fewer apologies (52.4% versus 
73.1%) and less customer advice (68.4% versus 89.5%). 
In examining the notification type patterns, we 
found that although some organizations appear to be 
focusing primarily on their own interests (1 opacity; 10 
company interest), many more organizations are at least 
partially (7 guarded; 59 balanced interest) or fully 
committed (70 full transparency; 35 customer interest) 
to serving customers with informative cybersecurity 
incident notifications. 
5.1. Contributions 
 From a research perspective, the six notification 
types that emerged from our study extend past work that 
identify the notification characteristics that are utilized 
by organizations during cybersecurity incidents. Based 
on the empirical data we collected, these six types 
provide unique insights into how these various 
characteristics are assembled within a notification. 
Indeed, these types may provide valuable clues into the 
strategic style that organizations employ when 
managing crisis situations. This line of inquiry follows 
past calls [e.g., 15] for research investigating the 
strategy used to select incident notification approaches. 
In doing so, our findings complement past work by 
Wang and Kuo [49], who consider potential links 
between an organization’s crisis response capabilities 
and its strategic style in terms of the prospector, 
defender, and analyzer typology proposed by Miles and 
Snow [50]. Wang and Kuo [49] find that where an 
organization has established a general strategic 
direction, its crisis response capabilities will be 
improved. To the extent that the notification types 
identified in our findings contain characteristics that are 
consistent and compatible with one another, it may  
indicate that the firm has established a broader strategy 
that has been operationalized within the crisis response 
activities. Likewise, those firms that simultaneously 
employ notification characteristics that are seemingly at 
odds with one another (e.g., whitewashing and 
compensation) may indicate that an organization has 
opportunities to establish a guiding strategic style.  
Our work also provides a distinctly global view of 
cybersecurity incident notifications. Since nearly 30% 
of our incident notifications were drawn from countries 
other than the United States, our results suggest that 
international approaches appear similar to the United 
States in some respects (e.g., value commitment) but are 
distinct in others (e.g., apologies). 
From a practical perspective, our findings point out 
how common characteristics of cybersecurity incident 
notifications are assembled. For new organizations or 
those struggling to decide on a consistent incident 
notification approach, the notification types highlighted 
in our findings can provide several possible options that 
could be considered for adoption. For organizations 
with a more mature incident notification approach that 
already corresponds to one of our notification types, our 
findings may help to highlight additional notification 
characteristic refinements that could be added in future 
notifications for improved consistency. 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
As with any research study, our work is subject to 
limitations that provide promising opportunities for 
future research. First, we acknowledge that for some 
cybersecurity incidents, no customer notification was 
produced (e.g., due to the lack of requirements to do so) 
and in others, the notification was not available (e.g., the 
organization removed it from its website). As a result, 
our findings are derived from those notifications that 
were publicly accessible at the time of our study. An 
interesting direction for future research may be to 
examine the characteristics of organizations that do and 
do not issue a customer notification following a 
cybersecurity incident.  
Second, although our study draws on 54 incident 
notifications originating from non-U.S. organizations, 
our analysis remains weighted towards incidents from 
U.S. organizations. Future research could extend this 
international focus by drawing on a wider time period to 
gain further insights into the patterns of cybersecurity 
notifications that exist around the world. As we note in 
our findings, 55 of our collected incident notifications 
did not fully fit into any of our six notification types. 
Interestingly, only 9 (16%) of these were from non-U.S. 
organizations, even though our sample was 29% 
international. This suggests that our identified 
notification types may align better with non-U.S. 
organizations and that future research could seek to find 
additional notification types used in U.S. organizations. 
 Third, our study examined notifications associated 
with individual cybersecurity incidents, but it remains 
unclear how notification strategies may change within a 
single organization for successive incidents. A 
promising opportunity for future research would be to 
conduct a longitudinal analysis of the extent that an 
organization uses similar or different incident 
notification approaches for different cybersecurity 
breaches that occur over time. 
 Finally, although our study identifies patterns 
within the characteristics of cybersecurity incident 
notifications, we stop short of connecting the resulting 
notification types to a measure of crisis response 
effectiveness. Future research could investigate if some 
notification types tend to correspond with particular 
downstream consequences such as customer lawsuits or 
customer retention. Establishing an empirical 
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relationship between an organization’s notification type 
and measurable customer consequences could further 
solidify the importance of notification choices as part of 
an organization’s cybersecurity crisis response. 
6. Conclusion 
This study set out to identify patterns contained 
within cybersecurity incident notifications by 
constructing a typology of response approaches. Based 
on analysis of 187 notifications, we identified three 
distinct types associated with the notification’s level of 
detail and three response types associated with the 
benefitting party. Our findings extend past 
classifications of cybersecurity incident notifications 
and provide a template of possible notification 
approaches to be adopted by organizations.  
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